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Intelligibility	All	the	Way	Down:	Interpreting	Nagel’s	Mind	and	Cosmos.	
	
Thomas	 Nagel’s	 Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 is,	 to	 date,	 his	 most	 recent	 philosophical	
monograph.1	It	has	also	proved	to	be	his	most	controversial	as	Nagel	was	dragged	
into	America’s	culture	wars	over	the	respective	roles	to	be	played	in	intellectual	
life	 between	 the	 claims	 of	 scientific	 belief	 and	 of	 religious	 faith.	 Yet,	 as	 I	 will	
demonstrate	in	this	paper,	this	book	is	simply	the	latest	development	of	an	anti-
reductionism	that	has	been	present,	as	a	leitmotif,	in	Nagel’s	oeuvre	over	a	forty-
year	period.	So	those	scandalized	by	the	book	are	a	little	late	to	the	party.	I	will	
outline	the	main	claims	of	the	book	and	trace	their	continuity	with	earlier	themes	
in	Nagel’s	work	before	assessing	their	philosophical	merits.		
	
The	Continuity	of	Nagel’s	Arguments	
The	 arguments	 of	Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 are	 clearly	 a	 continuation	 of	 some	 of	 the	
central	 themes	 of	 Nagel’s	 earlier	 work,	 particularly	 as	 expressed	 in	 the	 most	
comprehensive	 presentation	 of	 his	 philosophical	 outlook	 in	 The	 View	 from	
Nowhere2.	In	Mind	and	Cosmos	Nagel’s	argument	opens	with	the	claim	that	there	
is	 an	 ineradicable	 tension	 between	 two	 forms	 of	 our	 self-understanding	 that	
appears	most	vividly	in	the	restricted	case	of	the	mental/physical	problem	(this	
claim	is	also	made	in	The	View	from	Nowhere).	But	while	this	particular	example	
of	«	placing	»	mentality	in	the	physical	world	is	where	the	tension	appears	most	
strikingly,	 the	 ramifications	 of	 the	 problem	 are	 far	wider.	 Solving	 the	 problem	
involves	a	radical	change	in	our	self-understanding.	So	the	later	book	represents	
a	development	in	Nagel’s	thought	as	he	works	through	what	this	change	involves:		
«	[A]	 true	 appreciation	 of	 the	 difficulty	 of	 the	 problem	 must	 eventually	
change	our	conception	of	the	place	of	the	physical	sciences	in	describing	the	
natural	order3.	»	
	
What	do	I	mean	here	when	I	refer	to	«	two	forms	of	self-understanding	»?	First,	
that	we	think	of	ourselves	as	conscious	subjects	who	have	a	rational	nature	and	
who	engage	with	value;	second,	we	also	think	of	ourselves	as	part	of	the	natural	
																																																								
1	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos:	Why	the	Materialist	Neo-Darwinian	Conception	of	Nature	Is	Almost	
Certainly	False,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012.	
2	T.	Nagel,	The	View	from	Nowhere,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	1986.	
3	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	3.	
order.	By	«	the	natural	order	»	is	meant,	in	turn,	a	conception	of	nature	–	viewed	as	
a	totality	–	whose	existence	is	independent	of	us	and	which	we	claim	to	know	via	
different	forms	of	understanding	including	that	exemplified	by	the	sciences.	
Nagel	believes	that	a	tension	arises	because,	at	the	level	of	reflection,	we	
have	two	sets	of	irreconcilable	commitments:	that	to	which	we	seem	committed	
when	we	explain	mentality	seems	to	be	ruled	out	by	a	conception	of	ourselves	as	
part	of	the	natural	order	as	 that	 latter	 idea	has	been	developed	by	the	physical	
sciences.	(That	is,	given	the	contingent	historical	pathway	of	their	development	–	
this	point	will	prove	important	to	what	follows.)	Nagel’s	implication	seems	to	be	
that	science	has	been	set	on	the	wrong	path	by	philosophers’	commentary	on	its	
content	and	implications.	Early	in	the	book	Nagel	identifies	his	target	as	a	certain	
philosophical	view	and	not	a	scientific	one:	
«	[A]	 comprehensive,	 speculative	 world	 picture	 that	 is	 reached	 by	
extrapolation	from	some	of	the	discoveries	of	biology,	chemistry	and	physics	
–	 a	 particular	 naturalistic	 Weltanschaaung	 that	 postulates	 a	 hierarchical	
relation	 among	 the	 subjects	 of	 those	 sciences,	 and	 the	 completeness	 in	
principle	 of	 an	 explanation	 of	 everything	 in	 the	 universe	 through	 their	
unification4.	»		
	
So	Nagel	is	not	describing	current	physics.	It	is	–	notoriously	–	not	even	internally	
unified.	 Nor	 is	 he	 simply	 defining	 «	science	 »	 by	 iterating	 a	 list	 of	 disciplines	
whereby	 physical	 science	 is	 conjoined	 to	 all	 the	 other	 non-special	 and	 special	
sciences	 (however	 the	 line	 is	 drawn	between	 those	 two	 classes).	He	 is,	 rather,	
describing	 a	 philosophical	 view	 –	 hence	 the	 word	 «	speculative	»	 –	 that	
«	extrapolates	»	 from	 the	 success	 of	 the	 core	 sciences	 to	 a	 comprehensive	
philosophical	 naturalism	 that	 is	 also	 committed	 to	 the	 positivist	 project	 of	
explanatory	completeness	and	unification	by	explanatory	reduction.	
	 It	is	important	to	what	follows	that	Nagel’s	own	view	is	also,	ultimately,	a	
form	of	philosophical	naturalism;	unfortunately,	«	naturalism	»	is	one	of	the	most	
protean	 terms	 in	 recent	 philosophy.	 It	 is	 also	 true	 that	 the	 view	 that	 Nagel	
describes	as	reductionist	naturalism	does	not	understand	itself	to	be	reductionist	
–	its	proponents	take	it	to	be	the	one	true	naturalism.	However,	Nagel	is	not	alone	
in	identifying	a	view	of	this	kind	–	in	Mind	and	World,	John	McDowell	calls	the	view	
																																																								
4	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	4.	
that	Nagel	targets	by	the	name	of	«	bald	naturalism	»5.	So,	for	convenience,	I	will	
refer	 to	Nagel’s	view	as	«	naturalism	»	 and	a	view	 that	he	 rejects	«	reductionist	
naturalism	»	 even	 if	 its	 proponents	 would	 reject	 that	 characterization	 of	 their	
view.		
Nagel	 further	 conjoins	 reductionist	 naturalism	 to	 an	 epistemological	
project	 envisioned	 by	 the	 Vienna	 Circle	 in	 the	 guise	 of	 the	 International	
Encyclopedia	of	Unified	Science.	That	project	is	the	unification	of	all	the	sciences	
via	 reductive	 bridging	 laws.	 So,	 once	 again,	 Nagel	 is	 not	 critiquing	 any	 of	 the	
results	of	the	physical	sciences,	but	a	philosophical	view	that	is	extrapolated	from	
them:	
«	[S]uch	a	world	view	is	not	a	necessary	condition	of	the	practice	of	any	of	
those	sciences	…	most	practicing	scientists	may	have	no	opinion	about	the	
overarching	cosmological	questions	 to	which	 this	materialist	 reductionism	
provides	an	answer6.	»	
	
This	echoes	Nagel’s	earlier	critique	of	a	view	that	he	called	«	physicalism	»	in	The	
View	from	Nowhere:	a	critique	grounded	on	his	radical	realism.	Radical	realism	is	
the	 view	 that	 not	 only	 is	 our	 current	 understanding	 of	 the	 world	 fallible	 –	
something	most	philosophers	would	admit	–	but	 that	 future	conceptions	of	 the	
world	 might	 have	 the	 feature	 that	 we	 could	 not,	 now,	 understand	 them.	 To	
understand	them	now,	we	would	have	to	have	completed	an	iterated	sequence	of	
understandings	of	the	world	–	from	«	here	and	now	»	to	«	then	and	there	».	Nagel	
is	sceptical	that	this	ambition	could	be	realized.	
He	 believes	 that	 our	 current	 form	 of	 scientific	 understanding,	 then,	 is	
inherently	limited.	Nagel	does	not	mean	by	this	that,	given	our	current	methods,	
there	 are	 things	 we	 do	 not	 know	 –	 that	 is	 platitudinous.	 Rather,	 our	 current	
methods	have	necessary,	not	 contingent,	 limitations:	 there	are	 some	 things	we	
cannot	know	relative	to	our	current	understanding.	That	is,	however,	no	reason	to	
cut	 reality	 down	 to	 our	 size	 by	 drawing	 a	 principled	 connection	 between	 the	
knowable	and	the	real	that	ensures	that	the	latter	cannot	outstrip	the	former.	In	
The	 View	 from	 Nowhere,	 the	 physicalist,	 like	 the	 idealist,	 is	 accused	 of	 cutting	
reality	 down	 to	 size:	 of	 privileging	 one	 form	 of	 description	 of	 the	 world	 that	
																																																								
5	J.	McDowell,	Mind	and	World,	Cambridge,	MA,	Harvard	University	Press,	1994,	p.	xvii,	ff.	
6	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	4.	
aspires	to	be	both	comprehensive	and	complete.	Nagel	thinks,	once	again,	that	this	
ambition	cannot	be	realized.	His	radical	realism	is	the	true	form	of	realism	and	
one	that	runs	against	a	counter-current	of	idealism	that	Nagel	detects	in	the	work	
of	Wittgenstein	and	Davidson	–	as	well	as	the	misguided	view	of	the	physicalist.7	
In	 order	 to	 begin	 to	 make	 the	 case	 for	 an	 alternative	 to	 reductionist	
naturalism,	 Nagel	 proposes	 a	 transcendental	 argument	 that	 begins	 from	 an	
assumption	 shared	 with	 the	 scientific	 enterprise:	 that	 the	 world	 is	 rationally	
intelligible	–	all	the	way	down.	This	places	Nagel,	as	he	confesses,	in	the	tradition	
of	the	«	objective	idealism	»	of	Plato,	Schelling	and	Hegel:	an	underlying	order	to	
experience	is	postulated	to	make	a	superficial	phenomenon	intelligible.	To	admit	
that	 our	 explanations	 have	hit	 bedrock	 is,	 for	Nagel,	 a	 failure	 and	ought	 to	 re-
interpreted	as	a	 counsel	 to	dig	deeper8.	There	 is	always	a	deeper	 intelligibility	
conferring	 explanation	 to	 be	 found;	 if	we	 cannot	 find	 one,	 that	 is	 a	 contingent	
limitation	on	our	(current)	abilities.	We	are	in	a	world	not	of	our	own	making	that	
exists	anyway;	 if	we	 fail	 to	make	sense	of	part	of	 it,	 that	 reflects	 the	necessary	
limitations	of	the	current	state	of	our	understanding.	
From	Nagel’s	 rationalist	 perspective,	 as	 expressed	 in	Mind	 and	 Cosmos,	
merely	identifying	the	cause	of	a	phenomenon	is	not	enough;	nor	are	correlations	
between	 distinct	 phenomena.	We	 seek	 explanations	 and	 to	 explain	 is	 to	 bring	
events	 under	 some	 description	 or	 other.	 Those	 descriptions	 introduces	 an	
element	of	generality	that	is,	for	Nagel,	part	and	parcel	of	any	explanation9.	This	is	
the	basis	of	his	claim	that	there	would	be	a	«	double	involvement	»	of	mind	in	the	
natural	order	in	the	renovated	worldview	that	it	is	the	task	of	Mind	and	Cosmos	to	
make	plausible	to	us:		
«	The	intelligibility	of	the	world	is	no	accident.	Mind,	in	this	view,	is	doubly	
related	to	the	natural	order.	Nature	is	such	as	to	give	rise	to	conscious	beings	
with	minds;	and	it	is	such	as	to	be	comprehensible	to	such	beings.	Ultimately,	
therefore,	such	beings	should	be	comprehensible	 to	 themselves.	And	these	
are	 fundamental	 features	 of	 the	 universe,	 not	 byproducts	 of	 contingent	
developments	whose	 true	 explanation	 is	 given	 in	 terms	 that	 do	 not	make	
reference	to	mind10.	»		
																																																								
7	T.	Nagel,	View	from	Nowhere,	pp.	97,	pp.	105–109.	
8	While	accepting	that,	metaphysically,	“all	explanations	come	to	an	end	somewhere”.	T.	Nagel,	
Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	22.	
9	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	47.	
10	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	17.	
	For	Nagel,	the	hybris	of	the	reductionist	is	the	claim	that	the	reductive	naturalist	
world	picture,	which	excludes	the	mental	ab	initio,	suffices	reflexively	to	explain	
its	 own	 generation	 and	 acceptance	 by	 conscious	 subjects	 with	 reason.	 The	
reductive	naturalist	can	give	us	no	reason	to	believe	her	own	view	since	the	very	
idea	of	«		reasons	for	belief		»	does	not	feature	in	her	austere	ontology.11	
For	the	reductionist	naturalist,	her	position	suffers	merely	from	the	defect	
of	incompleteness:	we	are	already	in	a	position	to	state,	now,	that	«	mentalistic,	
teleological,	 or	 evaluative	 intelligibility	 …	 have	 been	 left	 behind	 for	 good	 as	
fundamental	 forms	of	understanding12	».	By	contrast,	Nagel	asks	us	 to	envisage	
what	a	conception	of	explanation	might	look	like	that	kept	these	alternative	forms	
of	intelligibility	in	play	–	that	make	«	mind,	meaning,	and	value	as	fundamental	as	
matter	and	space-time	 in	an	account	of	what	there	 is13	».	 In	envisaging	such	an	
alternative	Nagel	argues	that	we	need	to	re-conceive	of	the	sciences	of	life	in	such	
a	way	that	they	can	be	integrated	into	a	reflective	account	of	the	world	and	our	
place	 in	 it	 as	 conscious,	 rational,	 persons	 such	 that	 it	 is	 highly	probable	 that	 a	
temporal	process	could	have	led	to	the	evolution	of	minds	like	ours.	
Now	the	constraints	of	Nagel’s	commitment	to	panpsychism	intrude	on	the	
argument	in	a	way	I	will	explain	below:	because	he	is	a	panpsychist,	Nagel	believes	
that	we	cannot	understand	mentality	as	having	emerged	from	the	fundamentally	
non-mental.	It	can	have	arisen	as	a	development	only	from	that	which	was	«	proto-
mental	»	–	a	Nagelian	term	of	art	that	I	will	explain	below.	(He	also	uses	the	phrase	
«	proto-psychic	»	to	refer	to	the	same	properties.)	Having	given	grounds	for	rejecting	
theistic	and	materialistic	explanations	of	this	development,	Nagel	feels	compelled	
to	given	an	explanation	based	in	the	complexity	of	the	natural	order	itself.	
So	in	his	non-reductionist	naturalism,	we	have	to	assume	that	some	of	the	
basic	laws	of	working	of	the	universe	are	teleological	in	form	and	do	not	all	take	
the	 form	of	mechanistic	 causal	 laws.	That	which	 the	Dutch	historian	of	 science	
Eduard	Jan	Dijksterhuis	called	the	«	mechanization	of	the	world	picture	 	»	has	been	
mistakenly	 over-generalised:	 some	 causal	 processes	 may	 only	 be	 constitutively	
																																																								
11	For	an	argument	that	parallels	Nagel’s	see	L.	Rudder	Baker,	Saving	Belief:	A	Critique	of	
Physicalism,	Princeton	University	Press	1989.	
12	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	20.	
13	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	20.	
understood	in	terms	of	the	end	state	that	they	seek	(metaphorically)	to		realise	»14.	
Mentality,	 or	 proto-mentality,	 must	 be	 built	 into	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	
universe	 and	 its	 workings	 at	 the	 ground	 floor:	 its	 most	 fundamental	 laws	 of	
working	must	include	the	capacity	to	explain	how	proto-mentality	led	to	mentality	
in	the	guise	in	which	it	is	exemplified	in	us.	As	Nagel	puts	it	in	a	striking	metaphor,	
at	some	point	the	non-mental	universe	«	woke	up	».	He	seeks	a	non-reductionist,	
non-materialist,	 explanation	 of	 how	 that	 could	 be	 possible	 that	 makes	 it	
intelligible	 that	 such	 an	 occurrence	 would	 be	 a	 probable	 development	 in	 the	
workings	 of	 nature.	 He	 thinks	 the	 only	 way	 in	 which	 that	 is	 possible	 is	 by	
postulating	some	fundamental	laws	of	nature	that	are	teleological	in	form.	
	
Saving	the	Data	
At	some	point	in	the	history	of	the	universe	sentient	and	conscious	beings	came	
into	existence;	from	our	vantage	point	in	history	we	are	witness	to	the	evolution	
of	 a	 species	 in	 which	 we	 instantiate	 a	 capacity	 for	 reason	 that	 is	 reflectively	
applied	to	understanding	that	evolution	itself.	For	a	rationalist	like	Nagel,	reason	
gives	 us	 privileged	 insight	 into	 the	 truths	 of	 reason,	 and	 given	 his	 other	
philosophical	commitments	he	has	always	believed	that	ethics	and	mathematics	
are	paradigms	of	objective	knowledge	that	also	have	a	rationalist	basis.	Reason	
also,	as	he	argues	in	both	The	Last	Word	and	Mind	and	Cosmos,	gives	us	a	direct	
and	 unmediated	 access	 to	 certain	 truth	 of	 reason	 that	 are	 plausibly	 to	 be	
interpreted	as	a	priori15.		
Furthermore,	we	can	reflect	on	the	operations	of	our	mind	itself	and	see	
that	 we	 face,	 to	 borrow	 David	 Chalmer’s	 expression,	 a	 «	hard	»	 problem	 of	
consciousness	 that	 suffices	 to	 show	the	 falsity	of	psycho-physical	 reductionism	
about	the	mental16.	Such	reductionism	neither	therapeutically	dissolves	the	hard	
problem;	 nor	 does	 it	 explain	 it	 away.	 Hence	 the	 persistent	 sense	 that	 the	
reductionist	 has	 redefined	 the	 problem	 of	 placing	 mental	 properties	 in	 the	
physical	 world	 to	 make	 it	 “easy”	 –	 that	 means,	 in	 effect,	 soluble	 to	 her	 own	
																																																								
14	E.	J.	Dijksterhuis,	The	Mechanisation	of	the	World	Picture,	Princeton	University	Press,	1961.		
15	T.	Nagel,	The	Last	Word,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	Press,	1997.	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	
79–81.	
16	D.	Chalmers,	The	Conscious	Mind:	In	Search	of	a	Fundamental	Theory,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	
Press,	1996.
satisfaction,	but	to	no-one	else’s.	As	always	in	Nagel’s	philosophy,	we	begin	from	
forms	of	objective	knowledge,	and	capacities	that	find	their	expression	in	them,	
and	 seek	 a	 reflective	 account	 of	 our	place	 in	 the	world	 that	 is	 non-revisionary	
towards	 both.	 In	 that	 loose	 sense,	 of	 beginning	 from	 a	 minimally	 theorised	
conception	of	the	world	and	our	place	in	it,	Nagel	is	a	phenomenologist17.	
	 Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 is	 replete	 with	 subtle	 discussions	 of	 the	
phenomenological	 data	 to	 be	 derived	 from	 experience	 of	 consciousness,	
rationality	and	engagement	with	value.	Each	of	Nagel’s	separate	discussions	is	of	
interest	 in	 its	 own	 right.	 Individual	 chapters	 of	 the	 book	 are	 devoted	 to	
consciousness,	 cognition	 and	 value,	 interwoven	with	 the	 exposition	 of	 Nagel’s	
central	argument.	In	each	case,	Nagel	rejects	a	reductionist	account	of	the	form	of	
knowledge	in	question.	
In	these	characterisations	of	the	data	of	our	experience	it	is	the	problem	of	
consciousness	that	plays	the	most	important	role	in	Nagel’s	overall	conception.	He	
is,	after	all,	seeking	a	speculative	metaphysical	foundation	for	the	sciences	of	life	
in	 this	book.	The	 inadequacy	of	 the	views	 that	he	criticises	 seems	 to	him	most	
evident	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 mental/physical	 relation.	 It	 is	 his	 solution	 to	 that	
problem	–	the	case	of	neutral	monism	–	that	explains	a	great	deal	else	about	the	
arguments	of	Mind	and	Cosmos.		
Nevertheless,	Nagel	does	distinguish	the	challenges	that	each	of	the	three	
problems	poses	for	the	reductionist	as	that	carries	over	to	the	problem	facing	the	
anti-reductionist	naturalist	as	she	constructs	her	alternative	explanations.	Nagel	
seeks	explanations	that	address	two	kinds	of	questions:	one	constitutive	and	one	
historical	that	he	distinguishes	as	follows:	
«	An	 ahistorical	 constitutive	 account	 of	 how	 certain	 complex	 physical	
systems	are	also	mental,	and	a	historical	account	of	how	such	systems	arose	
in	the	universe	from	its	beginnings18.	»	
	
Nagel	 is	 sensitive	 to	 how	 these	 two	 different	 problems	 may	 place	 different	
constraints	on	their	solution.	Take	the	case	of	consciousness:	given	his	repeated	
rejection	of	emergentist	explanations,	his	explanation	will	be	«	reductive	»	in	his	
																																																								
17	M.	Ratcliffe,	«	Husserl	and	Nagel	on	Subjectivity	and	the	Limits	of	Physical	Objectivity	»	
Continental	Philosophy	Review,	vol.	35,	no.4,	pp.	353–377,	2002.	
18	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	54.	
own	sense	of	that	term.	That	is	what	drives	him	towards	panpsychism;	but	if	that	
adequately	 answers	 the	 constitutive	 problem,	 Nagel	 doubts	 that	 it	 can	 be	 an	
answer	to	the	second,	historical,	question.		
«	[I]t	is	not	clear	that	this	kind	of	reductive	explanation	could	really	render	
the	 result	 intelligible	…	 The	 protopsychic	 properties	 of	 all	matter,	 on	 this	
view,	 are	 postulated	 solely	 because	 they	 are	 needed	 to	 explain	 the	
appearance	of	consciousness	at	high	levels	of	organic	complexity.	Apart	from	
that,	 nothing	 is	 known	about	 them:	 they	are	 completely	 indescribable	 and	
have	 no	 predictable	 local	 effects,	 in	 contrast	 to	 the	 physical	 properties	 of	
electrons	and	protons,	which	allow	them	to	be	detected	individually.19	»	
	
Nagel	 is	also	troubled	by	how	we	are	even	to	understand	how	«	proto-mental	»	
properties	can	be	spatially	locatable.	But	that	is	not	the	real	problem,	as	frankly	
acknowledged	in	this	paragraph:	given	that	we	know	nothing	about	the	intrinsic	
nature	 of	 protopsychic	 properties	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 envisage	 the	 historical	
counterpart	to	the	constitutive	explanation	of	conscious	mentality.	
	 Further	sensitivity	to	the	difference	between	the	problems	emerges	when	
Nagel	turns	to	the	nature	of	rational	cognition.	Here,	some	kind	of	holism	seems	
to	 him	 inescapable,	 and	 any	 constitutive	 account	 given	 in	 terms	 of	more	 basic	
elements	does	not	come	close	to	offering	a	satisfactory	explanation	of	rationality:	
as	he	notes		«	just	as	consciousness	cannot	be	explained	as	a	mere	extension	or	
complication	 of	 physical	 evolution,	 so	 reason	 cannot	 be	 explained	 as	 a	 mere	
extension	or	complication	of	consciousness20.		»	
	 Nagel	believes	that	the	same	two	questions	–	constitutive	and	historical	–	
emerge	in	connection	with	values21.	The	answer	to	the	constitutive	question,	 in	
this	 case,	 involves	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 reason	 responsiveness:	 Nagel	 claims	 of	
evaluative	 facts	 that	 «	it	 is	 through	 being	 recognized	 as	 reasons	 by	 a	 value-
sensitive	 agent	 that	 they	 affect	 behavior 22 ».	 This	 is	 an	 avowedly	 anti-
psychologistic	conception	of	explanation;	again,	a	legacy	of	Nagel’s	much	earlier	
work	in	The	Possibility	of	Altruism	where	psychological	explanation	is	constrained	
by	 some	 identifiable	 a	 priori	 principles	 of	 practical	 reason.23	As	 in	 the	 case	 of	
																																																								
19	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	62.	
20	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	81.	
21	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	112–114.	
22	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	113.	
23	T.	Nagel,	The	Possibility	of	Altruism,	Oxford	University	Press,	1970.	For	an	assessment	of	this	
radical	anti-psychologism	see	A.	Thomas,	Value	and	Context:	the	Nature	of	Moral	and	Political	
rationality,	Nagel	does	not	think	that	a	reductive	explanation	will	be	plausible	in	
this	case.	
	 When	it	comes	to	the	historical	question	about	value,	Nagel	argues	that	the	
answer	is		«	much	more	obscure24	».	Conscious,	rational	beings	come	to	find	value,	
not	only	in	themselves	but	also	in	the	world:	
«	According	to	the	hypothesis	of	natural	teleology,	the	natural	world	would	
have	a	propensity	to	give	rise	to	beings	of	the	kind	that	have	a	good	–	beings	
for	which	things	can	be	good	or	bad25	.	»		
	
This	meets	Nagel̓s		criterion	for	an	acceptable	explanation	as	«	value	is	not	just	
an	 accidental	 side	 effect	 of	 life;	 rather,	 there	 is	 life	 because	 life	 is	 a	 necessary	
condition	of	value	26.		»	This	«	predisposition	»	on	the	part	of	the	cosmos	is,	Nagel	
admits,	a	speculation	that	is	unlikely	to	find	favor;	but	he	endorses	it	only	because	
he	thinks	no	other	explanation	is	plausible:	it	is	an	«	admissible	conjecture	given	
the	available	evidence27.		»	
Before	I	turn	to	the	alternative	conception	of	the	sciences	of	life	that	Nagel	
develops,	and	an	associated	critique	of	the	current	form	of	evolutionary	theory,	
more	needs	to	be	said	about	his	neutral	monism.	This	is	the	crucial	metaphysical	
breakthrough	that	has	led	Nagel	to	this	large-scale	critique	of	the	sciences	of	life	
even	though,	as	I	have	just	noted,	Nagel	is	worried	about	whether	the	view	can	be	
a	 comprehensive	 answer	 to	 both	 of	 the	 questions	 that	 he	 tries	 to	 answer,	
constitutive	and	historical,	for	each	of	the	three	domains	of	mentality,	rationality	
and	 evaluation.	 Nagel	 believes	 that	 a	 relatively	 local	 philosophical	 problem	 –	
explaining	the	relation	between	the	mental	and	the	physical	–	has	this	dramatic	
consequence.	That	is	because	in	understanding	this	relation	between	the	mental	
and	 the	 physical	we	 are	 given	 insight	 into	 the	 fundamental	 nature	 of	 the	 real,	
namely,	that	it	correctly	described	by	neutral	monism.	I	will	now	explain	what	that	
																																																								
Knowledge,	Oxford,	the	Clarendon	Press,	2006,	chapter	four;	A.	Thomas,	Thomas	Nagel,	London,	
Routledge,	2008,	chapter	four.	
24	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	117.	
25	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	121.	
26	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	123.	
27	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	124.	
view	is	supposed	to	be	and	how	it	relates	to	Nagel’s	independent	commitment	to	
panpsychism28.		
		
The	Central	Role	of	Neutral	Monism	
A	version	of	neutral	monism	first	emerged	in	Nagel’s	paper	«	The	Psychophysical	
Nexus	»,	where	he	 first	 speculated	 that	we	 are	on	 the	 verge	of	 discovering	 the	
nature	of	a	substance	whose	nature	necessitates	 that	 is	manifests	 itself	 in	both	
physical	and	mental	properties29.	Nagel	recapitulates	some	of	the	main	claims	of	
that	paper	in	Mind	and	Cosmos:	
«	[T]he	appearance	of	contingency	in	the	relation	between	mind	and	brain	
is	 probably	 an	 illusion	 …	 it	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 necessary	 but	 nonconceptual	
connection,	concealed	from	us	by	the	inadequacy	of	our	present	concepts	
…	we	should	expect	theoretical	progress	 in	this	area	to	require	a	major	
conceptual	revolution	…	We	ourselves	are	large-scale,	complex	instances	
of	 something	 both	 objectively	 physical	 from	 outside	 and	 subjectively	
mental	 from	 inside.	 Perhaps	 the	 basis	 for	 this	 identity	 pervades	 the	
world30.	»	
	
This	«	perhaps	»	 forms	the	basis	of	 the	arguments	of	Mind	and	Cosmos:	as	«	the	
Psychophysical	 Nexus	»	 made	 clear,	 uncovering	 this	 substrate	 that	 upwardly	
necessitates	both	its	mental	and	physical	aspects	would	be	an	empirical	discovery	
by	 the	 sciences	 of	 the	 mind;	 but	 there	 is	 philosophical	 insight	 in	 coming	 to	
understand	 the	 form	 that	 an	 intelligibility	 conferring	 explanation	 of	 the	
mental/physical	relation	has	to	take.	So	while	there	is	one	sense	in	which	it	is	up	
to	 science	 to	 discover	 the	 substrate,	 there	 is	 another	 sense	 in	which	we	 have	
solved	the	philosophical	problem	of	the	mental/physical	relation	in	that	we	have	
identified	the	form	that	any	successful	explanation	would	have	to	take.	
This	underlying	substrate,	then,	is	neither	mental	nor	physical	in	its	own	
right:	hence	the	word	«	neutral	».	There	may	well	be	a	plurality	of	such	substances,	
but	 each	 of	 them	 is	 of	 the	 same	 fundamental	 type,	 hence	 the	monism.	 Yet,	 for	
reasons	I	will	shortly	explain,	Nagel	seems	to	have	come	to	accept	that	this	view	is	
																																																								
28	This	commitment	goes	back	to	one	of	Nagel’s	earliest	papers:	T.	Nagel	«	Panpsychism	»	in	
Mortal	Questions,	pp.	181–195.	
29	T.	Nagel,	«	The	Psychophysical	Nexus	»	in	Concealment	and	Exposure,	Oxford,	Oxford	University	
Press,	2002,	pp.	194–236.	
30	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	41–2,	emphasis	added.	
more	 accurately	 classified	 as	 a	 version	 of	 dual	 aspect	 theory	 and	 in	Mind	 and	
Cosmos	it	is	revised	to	make	it	a	purer	exemplar	of	neutral	monism.	
	 The	key	components	of	Nagel’s	version	of	neutral	monism	–	a	view	with	a	
long	history	in	philosophy	–	is	that	it	«	accounts	for	the	relation	between	mind	and	
brain	in	terms	of	something	more	basic	about	the	natural	order	»31.	This	«	more	
basic”	thing	is	unitary	as	«	the	constituents	of	the	universe	have	properties	that	
explain	not	only	its	physical	but	its	mental	character	».	In	Mind	and	Cosmos	Nagel	
quotes	Thomas	Sorrell’s	view	that	 these	basic	elements	are	«	transphysical	and	
transmental32.	»	This,	then,	captures	both	the	neutrality	of	the	elements	–	they	are	
neither	physical	nor	mental	–	and	their	unitary	nature	as	they	form	one	kind.	Any	
basic	constituent,	even	if	is	not	part	of	a	person,	could	be	a	part	of	something	with	
mental	features.	Therefore,	it	must	form	part	of	an	explanation	of	why	a	mental	
subject	has	an	underlying	nature	that	is,	in	itself,	neither	distinctively	mental	nor	
physical.		
	 However,	 Leopold	 Stubenberg	 has	 noted	 an	 important	 shift	 between	
Nagel’s	 position	 in	 «	The	Psychophysical	Nexus	»	 to	 the	 view	 later	 defended	 in	
Mind	and	Cosmos33.	The	former	explains	the	«	neutrality	»	of	mental	and	physical	
aspects	via	what	Stubenberg	calls	the	«	neither	»	view:	an	aspect	of	a	substrate	is	
«	neutral	just	in	case	it	is	intrinsically	neither	mental	nor	physical	»	He	cites	this	
passage	as	evidence	of	Nagel’s	earlier	view	of	neutrality:		
«	[T]his	view	would	imply	that	the	fundamental	constituents	of	the	world,	out	of	
which	everything	is	composed,	are	neither	physical	nor	mental	but	something	more	
basic.	 This	 position	 is	 not	 equivalent	 to	 panpsychism.	 Panpsychism	 is,	 in	 effect,	
dualism	all	the	way	down.	This	is	monism	all	the	way	down34	».		
	
Stubenberg	contrasts	this	paragraph	with	the	later	position	in	Mind	and	Cosmos:	
«	Everything,	living	or	not,	is	constituted	from	elements	having	a	nature	that	is	both	
physical	and	nonphysical—that	is,	capable	of	combining	into	mental	wholes.	So	this	
reductive	account	can	also	be	described	as	a	form	of	panpsychism:	all	the	elements	
of	the	physical	world	are	also	mental35	».		
	
																																																								
31	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.56.	
32	T.	Sorrell,	Descartes	Reinvented,	Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2005,	p.	95.	Quoted	in	
T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	57.	
33	L.	Stubenberg,	«	Neutral	Monism	»	in	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	2016.	
34	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.231.	
35	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	2012,	p.57.	
Stubenberg’s	worry	is	that	this	is	an	equivocation	–	or	shift	–	in	what	Nagel	means	
by	«	neutral	».	
In	the	earlier	paper,	Nagel	holds	what	Stubenberg	calls	the	«	neither	»	view	
of	 the	 neutrality	 component	 of	 neutral	 monism:	 the	 aspects	 are	 neither	
intrinsically	mental	nor	intrinsically	physical.	However,	by	the	later	book	Nagel	
holds	the	«	both	»	view	of	neutrality	where	aspects	are	both	physical	and	mental.	
These	are	two	different	senses	of	«	neutrality	».	Seeking	clarification,	Stubenberg	
received	the	following	explanation	in	personal	correspondence	from	Nagel:	
«	[T]he	fundamental	elements	would	be	neither	merely	physical	nor	merely	mental,	
but	something	that	was	necessarily	both	physical	and	mental,	(or	protomental);	but	
since	 this	necessary	connection	can’t	hold	directly	between	 the	physical	and	 the	
mental	 as	 we	 conceive	 them,	 it	 would	 require	 that	 the	 real	 character	 of	 these	
fundamental	 constituents	be	something	more	basic	 that	accounts	 for	 their	being	
both	physical	and	(proto)mental36	».		
	
So	Stubenberg	is	right:	there	is	an	important	change	here.	
The	 view	 in	 «	The	Psychophysical	Nexus	»	 ought	 –	 in	 retrospect	 –	 to	 be	
interpreted	as	a	 form	of	dual	aspect	theory	with	a	clear	distinction	between	an	
underlying	substance	and	the	upwards	entailment	of	two	kinds	of	aspect	–	mental	
or	physical.	By	Mind	and	Cosmos	that	view	has	been	superseded	by	pansychism	in	
a	way	driven	by	the	commitment	to	monism.	Nagel	has	always	been	a	panpsychist,	
so	 in	 the	period	between	 the	publication	of	 these	 two	works	he	seems	 to	have	
revised	his	dual	aspect	theory	to	make	it	consistent	with	his	panpsychism:	on	the	
«	both	»	 view	 of	 neutrality	 in	 the	 later	 work	 «	the	 fundamental	 elements	 [are]	
necessarily	both	physical	and	mental	».		
Yet,	as	we	have	seen,	Mind	and	Cosmos	combines	a	re-affirmtion	of	Nagel’s	
commitment	to	panpsychism	with	the	frank	expression	of	a	problem	for	that	view:	
Nagel	 is	 concerned	 that	 panpsychism	 may	 do	 better	 as	 an	 explanation	 of	 the	
constitutive	nature	of	consciousness	than	as	an	account	of	its	historical	evolution.	
I	would	surmise	that	the	postulation	of	 teleological	 laws	 in	Mind	and	Cosmos	 is	
developed	precisely	to	address	this	subsidiary	problem.	Panpsychism	remains	as	
an	 answer	 to	 the	 constitutive	 question,	 but	 fundamental	 teleological	 laws	 are	
																																																								
36	T.	Nagel,	T.	personal	correspondence,	not	dated,	cited	in	L.	Stubenberg,	«	Neutral	Monism	»	in	
The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	2016.	
	
necessary	postulates	if	one	wants	to	answer	the	historical	question.	They	might	
also	then	play	a	role	in	any	holistic	account	of	the	nature	of	rationality	or	in	an	
explanatory	account	of	the	origin	of	value	–	Nagel	is	clear	that	his	aim	is	nothing	
less	than	a	«	theory	of	everything	».	
So	what	motivated	Nagel’s	move	from	dual	aspect	theory	to	panpsychism	
as	an	answer	to	the	constitutive	question?	I	surmise	that	the	crucial	argument	for	
the	change	 is	 this:	mentality	does	not	manifest	 itself	everywhere.	Persons	have	
mental	 attributes;	 pet	 rocks	 do	 not	 –	 not	 really.	 However,	 in	 any	 case	 where	
mentality	does	not	manifest	itself,	the	same	underlying	substrate	must	be	involved	
(because	of	the	commitment	to	monism).	That	substrate,	 then,	either	manifests	
physicality	 and	 mentality	 (where	 mentality	 is	 instantiated)	 or	 physicality	 and	
proto-mentality	 (where	mentality	 is	 not	 instantiated).	 To	 preserve	 the	 unified	
nature	of	the	underlying	substance	–	this	is,	after	all,	a	form	of	monism	–	it	is	always	
either	one	or	the	other:	hence	the	panpsychism	(in	its	«	both	»	version	where	the	
fundamental	elements	are	«	transphysical	and	transmental	»).	
This	is	not,	then,	the	claim	that	everything	is	mental,	but	that	everything	is	
either	mental	or	«	proto-mental	».	This	is	the	view,	then,	whose	«	appearance	…	
casts	its	shadow	back	over	the	entire	process	»	–	the	process,	that	is,	described	by	
the	sciences	of	life37.	Nagel	presents	his	basic	argument	for	monism	as	follows38:	
«	[S]ince	conscious	organisms	are	not	composed	of	a	special	kind	of	stuff,	
but	can	be	constructed,	apparently,	from	any	of	the	matter	of	the	universe	
suitably	 arranged	 it	 follows	 that	 this	 monism	 will	 be	 universal.	
Everything,	living	or	not,	is	constituted	from	elements	having	a	nature	that	
is	both	physical	and	nonphysical	–	that	is	capable	of	being	combined	into	
mental	 wholes.	 So	 this	 reductive	 account	 can	 also	 be	 described	 as	
panpsychism;	all	the	elements	of	the	physical	world	are	also	mental39	».		
	
Nagel	 frankly	admits	that	his	outline	of	how	we	might	change	our	foundational	
assumptions	in	the	life	sciences	is	speculative,	but	it	is	reasoned	speculation	that	
appeals	not	 to	 theism,	but	 to	«	complications	 to	 the	 immanent	character	of	 the	
natural	order40	».	It	would	not	only	be	a	unifying	explanation,	but	a	more	unifying	
																																																								
37	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	8.	
38	Nagel	explains	his	distinction	between	“reductive”	and	“reductionist”:	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	
Cosmos,	p.	44,	fn.	14.	
39	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	57.	
40	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	12.	
explanation	that	its	theistic	rivals	given	that	those	views,	too,	assume	that	the	only	
naturalistic	 option	 is	 a	 reductive	 naturalism.	 Reductive	 naturalism	 shapes	 the	
form	taken	by	the	theistic	«	intelligent	design	»	alternative;	absent	the	presumed	
sexism,	we	 can	 use	 J.	 L.	 Austin’s	 phrase	 that	 these	 two	positions	 “take	 in	 each	
other’s	washing”41.		Nagel’s	position	is,	in	that	sense,	even	more	radical	than	that	
envisaged	 by	 proponents	 of	 intelligent	 design:	 his	 view	 is	 that	 «	materialist	
naturalism,	is	false,	and	not	just	around	the	edges	»42.	One	immediate	payoff,	as	
the	book	makes	clear,	is	that	we	need	to	take	another	look	–	a	more	sceptical	and	
challenging	look	–	at	the	reductionist,	materialist,	understanding	of	the	theory	of	
evolution.	
	
Nagel’s	Critique	of	Evolutionary	Theory	
Nagel’s	critique	of	the	theory	of	evolution	is	at	the	heart	of	his	book	and	explains	
a	great	deal	of	the	controversy	that	it	has	generated.	This	is	not	least	because	in	
developing	this	critique	Nagel	is	happy,	in	developing	a	sceptical	account	of	the	
theory	 of	 evolution	 in	 its	 current	 guise,	 to	 borrow	 arguments	 from	 religiously	
motivated	 proponents	 of	 intelligent	 design	 –	 even	 while	 he	 rejects	 their	
alternative	theistic	explanation	for	the	appearance	of	design.	(In	their	case,	that	
the	 appearance	 ought	 to	 be	 accepted	 at	 face	 value.)	 We	 need	 to	 explain	 how	
mentality	 could	 have	 evolved,	 given	 the	 truth	 of	 Nagel’s	 neutral	 monism,	 as	
opposed	to	simply	accepting	existing	conceptions	of	evolution	too	closely	tied,	he	
implies,	to	psychophysical	reductionism.		
	 As	 Nagel	 notes	 –	 anticipating	 the	 controversy	 his	 book	 would	 cause	 –	
criticizing	the	theory	of	evolution	is	viewed	as	both	«	politically	incorrect	»	as	well	
as	 scientifically	 incorrect.	 But	 Nagel	 believes	 that	 standard	 conceptions	 of	
evolutionary	theory	–	he	calls	them	variously	«	materialist	»	or	«	neo-Darwinian	»	
–	fall	with	the	psycho-physical	reductionism	they	seek	to	vindicate.	He	argues	that,	
to	this	point,	we	have	understood	the	«	Book	of	Nature	»	in	physico-mathematical	
terms	 that	 have	 omitted	 the	 mind’s	 place	 in	 nature.	 Concomitantly,	 biological	
																																																								
41	«	[T]hese	two	terms,	‘sense	data’	and	‘material	things’,	live	by	taking	in	each	other’s	washing	–	
what	 is	 spurious	 is	 not	 one	 term	 of	 the	 pair,	 but	 the	 antithesis	 itself.	 »	 J.	 L.	 Austin,	 Sense	 and	
Sensibilia,	Oxford	University	Press,	p.	4.	(I	think	we	may	safely	presume	that	Austin	did	not	take	in	
his	own	washing.)	
42	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	15.	
theory	has	restricted	 itself	 to	mechanistic	explanations	as	part	of	 this	unhappy	
alliance	 with	 psycho-physical	 reductionism.	 Neutral	 monism	 opens	 up	 the	
prospect	of	a	reorientation	of	the	sciences	of	life	around	principles	that	«	are	in	
their	logical	form	teleological	and	not	mechanistic43	».		
«	Mind,	as	a	development	of	life,	must	be	included	as	the	most	recent	stage	of	this	
long	 cosmological	 history,	 and	 its	 appearance	…	 casts	 its	 shadow	back	 over	 the	
entire	 process	 and	 the	 constituents	 and	 principles	 on	 which	 the	 process	
depends44.	»		
	
	Can	 we	 infer,	 then,	 from	 this	 foundational	 error	 in	 the	 assumptions	 of	
evolutionary	theory,	that	it	is	intellectually	unsatisfactory	in	its	current	form?	
Nagel	thinks	that	we	are	entitled	to	draw	this	conclusion.	In	particular,	he	
claims	that	evolutionary	theory,	understood	in	a	reductive	and	mechanistic	way,	
cannot	answer	two	questions:	
«	[W]hat	 is	 the	 likelihood	that	self-reproducing	 life	 forms	should	have	come	 into	
existence	spontaneously	on	the	early	earth,	solely	through	the	operation	of	the	laws	
of	physics	and	chemistry?	
	
	In	the	available	geological	time	since	the	first	life	forms	appeared	on	earth,	what	is	
the	 likelihood	 that,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 physical	 accident,	 a	 sequence	 of	 viable	 genetic	
mutations	should	have	occurred	that	was	sufficient	to	permit	natural	selection	to	
produce	the	organisms	that	actually	exist?45	»		
	
Nagel	adds	further	claims	to	his	critique:	that	evolutionary	theory	is	incomplete	
(merely	an	explanation	sketch	or	«	schema	»);	it	lacks	sufficient	evidential	support	
and	 must	 rest	 on	 «	general	 assumptions	 »;	 that	 it	 runs	 contrary	 to	 common	
sense46.	
Critics	are	surely	right	to	find	this	conjunction	of	claims	about	the	current	
understanding	 of	 evolutionary	 theory	 unconvincing.	 To	 take	 them	 in	 reverse	
order:	being	«	contrary	to	common	sense	»	is	a	weak	argument	given	that	many	
well-established	scientific	claims	seem	contrary	to	common	sense.	An	historical	
perspective	on	how	scientific	theories	of	the	past	were	received	by	the	audiences	
																																																								
43	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	7.	
44	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	8.	
45	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	p.	6.	
46	T.	Nagel,	Mind	and	Cosmos,	pp.	6–7.	
contemporaneous	to	them	would	seem	to	strengthen	this	point	–	particularly	so	
in	the	case	of	the	theory	of	evolution	when	first	put	forward	by	Darwin.	
On	Nagel’s	second	objection:	whole	books	are	written	on	why	superstring	
theory	is	a	sociologically	well-entrenched	position	in	physics	poorly	supported	by	
evidence.	On	any	realistic	conception	of	how	science	actually	operates	sometimes	
«	general	assumptions	»	do	play	an	important	role	in	the	acceptance	of	scientific	
theories.	Clearly,	there	may	be	something	intellectually	unsatisfactory	about	this	
state	of	affairs	if	it	persists	–	or	the	critiques	of	superstring	theory	would	not	be	
written	–	but	my	point	is	that	it	is	not	unusual	for	«	general	assumptions	»	to	carry	
a	burden	of	proof,	 at	 least	provisionally.	The	answer	 to	Nagel’s	 concern	would	
seem	 to	 be:	 more	 and	 better	 science	 (of	 the	 same	 general	 type)	 in	 the	 field	
concerned	that	will	see	us	do	better	«	over	the	long	run	».		
Finally,	on	the	third	point,	 if	we	have	only	explanation	sketches	 in	these	
cases,	then	the	answer,	once	again,	is	that	scientists	working	in	the	field	face	the	
task	of	coming	up	with	better,	more	detailed,	more	convincing	explanations	–	a	
task	that	does	not	require	comment	from	the	sidelines	from	those	not	expert	in	
the	field.	
If	Nagel’s	challenge	to	the	current	understanding	of	evolutionary	theory	is	
to	be	stronger	than	this,	then,	he	needs	to	do	more	than	raise	sceptical	questions	
about	it;	these	are	what	Peirce	called	«	paper	doubts	».	He	needs	to	substantiate	
the	claim	that	the	transition	from	psycho-physical	reductionism	in	the	philosophy	
of	mind	to	neutral	monism	pays	substantial	philosophical	dividends.	It	is	because	
we	 have	 been	 successfully	 convinced	 that	 we	 need	 a	 new	 paradigm	 for	 the	
explanation	of	mind	and	value	that	we	are	forced	to	revise	our	assumptions	about	
evolutionary	theory	and	to	look	at	its	foundational	commitments	in	a	new	light.	
Nagel	may	 reasonably	 respond	 that	 it	 is	 not	 his	 job	 to	 re-write	 the	 life	
sciences;	 it	 is	 simply	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 some	 of	 their	 deepest	 foundational	
commitments	in	order	to	hold	open	intellectual	possibilities	that	seem	definitively	
closed	for	mistaken	reasons.	But	if	we	seek	more	than	that,	there	must	at	least	be	
an	outline	of	an	argument	that	takes	us	from	Nagel’s	foundational	re-orientation	
to	better	answers	to	the	two,	fundamental,	probabilistic	questions	with	which	he	
begins:	 first,	how	does	the	recovery	of	natural	 teleology	allow	us	to	give	better	
answers	 to	 the	 questions	 of	 the	 origin	 of	 life?	 Second,	 is	 a	 single	 mechanism	
adequate	to	explain	all	the	current	forms	that	life	takes?	
Nagel	believes	that	we	are	justified	in	beginning	from	our	well-grounded	
experiences	 that	 we	 use	 our	 ordinary	 capacities	 for	 knowledge	 –	 perception,	
reason	and	conscious	awareness	–	and	to	conclude	on	that	basis	that	this	is	data	
that	no	intellectually	satisfying	explanation	can	overturn.	Re-capitaluating	some	
of	the	central	claims	of	his	book	The	Last	Word,	the	exercise	of	our	basic	capacities	
for	knowledge	gives	us	reasons	with	greater	intellectual	authority	than	that	of	any	
sceptical	challenge	to	those	capacities	and	reasons.47	On	the	contrary,	this	basic	
point	guides	us	towards	a	constraint	on	a	solution	to	the	problem	to	hand:	
«	[T]he	 appearance	 of	 living	 organisms	 has	 eventually	 given	 rise	 to	
consciousnesss,	perception,	desire,	action	and	the	formation	of	both	beliefs	
and	intentions	on	the	basis	of	reasons.	If	all	this	has	a	natural	explanation,	the	
possibilities	were	 inherent	 in	 the	 universe	 long	 before	 there	was	 life,	 and	
inherent	 in	 early	 life	 long	 before	 the	 appearance	 of	 animals.	 A	 satisfying	
explanation	would	 show	 that	 the	 realization	 of	 these	 possibilities	was	 not	
vanishingly	improbable	but	a	significant	likelihood	given	the	laws	of	nature	
and	the	composition	of	the	universe.	It	would	reveal	mind	and	reason	as	basic	
aspects	of	a	nonmaterialistic	natural	order48	.»		
	
It	is	worth	recalling	that	by	«	nomaterialistic	»	Nagel	is	here	referring	back	to	
his	neutral	monism	in	which	the	basic	elements	of	reality	are	trans-mental	and	
trans-physical	 alike.	What	 conception	 of	 law	would	make	 it	 intelligible	 how	
elements	 like	 these	 developed	 over	 time	 to	 compose	 conscious,	 rational,	
valuing	creatures	like	us?	
Nagel	is	transferring	the	burden	of	proof:	given	other	things	we	know,	
of	at	least	as	much	certainty	as	the	theory	of	evolution,	then	that	theory	must	
meet	the	standard	of	rationalist	intelligibility	in	explaining	how	creatures	with	
our	capacities	came	into	existence	–	or	we	must	reject	that	standard.	Several	of	
Nagel’s	 critics	have	willingly	embraced	 the	 latter	option;	now	 the	burden	of	
proof	is	on	them	to	offer	individual	explanations	of	how	we	do	not	seem	to	know	
what	Nagel	thinks	we	can	demonstrate	that	we	do	know.	We	know,	in	a	way	
immune	to	sceptical	challenge	to	our	basic	capacities	for	knowledge,	that	we	
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are	conscious	beings	with	direct	knowledge	of	the	truths	of	reason.	Given	his	
wider	 philosophical	 rationalism,	Nagel	 extends	 this	 defense	 to	 the	 truths	 of	
mathematics	and	ethics,	too.	If,	however,	we	accept	the	standard,	and	accept	
the	 validity	 of	 the	 knowledge	 claims,	 then	 we	 need	 to	 look	 again	 at	 the	
foundational	assumptions	of	the	sciences	of	life	as	Nagel	recommends	and	as	I	
shall	now	exposit.	
	
Nagel’s	Renovated	Conception	of	the	Sciences	of	Life	
Given	the	boldness	of	Nagel’s	claims,	one	might	have	expected	in	Mind	and	Cosmos	
a	 detailed	 working	 out	 of	 the	 new	 form	 that	 the	 sciences	 of	 life	 must	 take.	
However,	Nagel	believes	–	correctly	in	my	view	–	that	this	is	not	the	role	of	the	
philosopher.	The	task	she	faces	is	to	articulate	the	relation	between	high	level	and	
abstract	conceptions	of	how	the	world	works	to	the	more	detailed	specification	of	
those	 conceptions	 exemplified	 by	 the	 sciences	 themselves.	 Philosophy	 and	 the	
sciences	may	well	have	parted	company	 for	good	 in	 the	seventeenth	century	–	
those	who	complain	that	philosophy	makes	no	intellectual	progress	forget	that	it	
spins	off	successful	sciences	that	become	autonomous	from	it	–	but	philosophical	
presuppositions	may	continue	to	place	empirical	enquiry	on	the	wrong	path	by	
falsely	constraining	the	available	options.	That	seems	to	be	Nagel’s	view:	empirical	
scientists	go	about	their	business	with	no	regard	for	philosophy,	but	he	implies	
that	 high	 level	 philosophical	 misconceptions	 may	 play	 a	 role	 in	 prematurely	
shutting	 down	 paths	 of	 enquiry	 that	 should	 have	 remained	 open.	 The	
mechanisation	 of	 the	 world-picture	 was	 undoubtedly	 a	 significant	 intellectual	
achievement,	but	if	philosophers	are	guilty	of	over-generalising	its	success,	then	
they	 are	prematurely	 foreclosing	on	 explanatory	options	 in	 the	 sciences	 of	 life	
without	sufficient	grounds	for	doing	so.	
	 The	basic	idea,	then,	is	that	we	need	a	general	conception	of	the	sciences	of	
life	 that	 does	 not	 reflect	 the	 false	 philosophical	 outlook	 of	 the	 reductionist	
materialist.	Nagel’s	specific	proposal,	as	I	have	noted,	depends	on	the	constraints	
placed	on	these	sciences	by	his	panpsychism.		
	 The	 panpsychist	 has	 to	 deny	 that	 the	 mental	 emerges	 from	 the	
fundamentally	non-mental,	whether	in	the	development	of	each	individual	or	at	
the	level	of	the	whole	species.	The	obvious	opponent	here	is	the	emergentist,	who	
argues	that	the	fundamentally	non-mental	can	develop	in	its	complexity	until	we	
reach	 the	 point	 at	 which	 sophisticated	 biological	 organisms	 start	 to	 exhibit	
cognitive	 states	 –	 at	 some	 particular	 time	 in	 their	 evolutionary	 history.	 As	 a	
further,	complex	development	within	cognition	–	and	different	accounts	explain	
this	 complexity	 in	different	ways	–	 cognition	develops	 into	consciousness49.	 So	
conscious	mentality	is	an	emergent	feature	of	sophisticated	organisms	that	also	
have	a	«	base	level	»	description	that	 is	wholly	physical.	This	 is	the	emergentist	
explanation	of	mentality	that	is	a	rival	to	Nagel’s	panpsychism.	
Nagel	 recapitulates,	 and	 endorses,	 his	 earlier	 critiques	 of	 emergentism	
interpreted	as	a	constitutive	account	of	what	makes	a	given	organism	conscious;	
«	it	 still	 seems	 like	magic	»50.	 	Emergence,	 for	Nagel,	 	 can	play	a	 limited	part	 in	
derivative	 explanations;	 his	 critique	 applies	 only	 its	 deployment	 in	 basic	
explanations.	However,	he	thinks	that	even	in	derivative	explanations	the	idea	of	
emergence	must	always	be	«	cashed	out	».	However,	when	we	do	cash	it	out	we	
see	 that	 it	 is	 «	analysed	 through	 the	 character	 and	 interactions	 of	 …	 more	
elementary	 components51	»	 	 and	 can	 see	 its	 inadequacy.	 Any	 such	 explanation	
rules	out	the	«	completely	new	»;	but	this	is	why	the	emergentist		cannot	explain	
consciousness 52 .	 Nagel	 can	 accept	 the	 uncontroversial	 claim	 of	 epistemic	
emergence	where	we	can	be	surprised	by	a	discovery	of	a	consequence	of	what	
we	know.	Metaphysical	emergence	is	categorical	different.	The	panpsychist	denies	
that	 the	 mental	 could	 ever	 emerge	 from	 the	 non-mental	 even	 if	 we	 add	 in	
complexity.	If	you	make	a	complex	physical	system	even	more	complex,	well,	that	
is	what	you	end	up	with	–	a	difference	of	degree,	not	one	of	kind.	For	Nagel,	even	
the	most	complex	physical	systems	still	fall	the	wrong	side	of	the	mental/physical	
divide:	
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[huh?	This	is	obscure.]	
«	If	 evolutionary	 theory	 is	 a	 purely	 physical	 theory,	 then	 it	 might	 in	
principle	 provide	 the	 framework	 for	 a	 physical	 explanation	 of	 the	
appearance	 of	 behaviorally	 complex	 animal	 organisms	 with	 central	
nervous	 systems.	 But	 subjective	 consciousness,	 if	 it	 is	 not	 reducible	 to	
something	 physical,	 would	 not	 be	 part	 of	 this	 story;	 it	 would	 be	 left	
completely	 unexplained	 by	 physical	 evolution	 –	 even	 if	 the	 physical	
evolution	of	such	organisms	is	in	fact	a	causally	necessary	and	sufficient	
condition	for	consciousness53	.»		
	
For	the	rationalist	such	as	Nagel,	it	is	not	sufficient	to	assert	a	brute	correlation	
between	sophisticated	physical	 things	and	mental	 features:	 their	co-occurrence	
must	 be	 intelligible,	 hence	 necessitated.	 (Needless	 to	 say,	 those	 not	 equally	
committed	to	philosophical	rationalism	deny	this	connection:	for	them,	perhaps	
necessities	are	intelligible,	but	the	converse	does	not	hold.54)	
From	Nagel’s	perspective	it	is	non-accidental	that	some	physical	things	are	
conscious,	 so	a	reductionist	naturalism	that	sees	a	world	wholly	describable	 in	
terms	of	basic	physical	causal	laws	is	failing	even	to	explain	the	actual	world.	That	
is	 because	 it	 is	 failing	 to	 explain	 part	 of	 it	 –	 its	 conscious,	mental,	 part.	 If	 the	
implication	 of	 reductionist	 naturalism	 is	 that	 the	 fundamental	workings	 of	 the	
world	can	stay	the	same	whether	parts	of	it	are	conscious	or	not	–	modulo	some	
magical	mind	stuff	added	to	it	to	explain	why	parts	of	it	are	conscious	when	they	
are	–	then	this	is	a	flawed	basic	conception55.	This	is	the	fundamental	thought	that	
motivates	Nagel’s	panpsychism:	we	have	to	build	in	to	our	basic	conception	of	the	
world		that	part	of	the	world	manifests	mental	properties.	This	potentiality,	then,	
must	be	an	aspect	of	even	the	most	fundamental	properties:	hence	the	conception	
of	them	as	trans-physical	and	trans-mental56.		
	 An	important	intermediate	assumption	in	Nagel’s	argument	is	that	what	he	
calls	a	«	nonhistorical	»	theory	of	consciousness,	which	explained	of	any	particular	
organism	why	it	was	or	was	not	conscious,	cannot	be	independent	of	a	theory	of	
how	conscious	organisms	arose	in	the	first	place.	A	single	process	would	have	to	
explain	 both	 the	 evolution	 of	 conscious	mentality	 and	 supply	 the	 basis	 for	 the	
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«	nonhistorical	»	product	of	that	process.	That	is	why	his	panspychism	evolves	in	
Mind	 and	 Cosmos	 to	 include	 a	 novel	 conception	 of	 scientific	 law	 that	 could	
accommodate	that	explanatory	demand.	
	 Nagel	 thinks	 that	a	 reconsideration	of	 the	sciences	of	 life	would	have	 to	
include	«	a	 teleological	account	»	 that	postulates	the	existence	of	«	principles	of	
self-organisation	or	of	the	development	of	complexity	over	time	»57	that	are	not	
solely	grounded	on	casual	law	as	conceived	of	in	an	orthodox	way:		
«	Natural	teleology	would	mean	that	the	universe	is	governed	rationally	
in	more	than	one	way	–	not	only	through	the	quantitative	laws	of	physics	
that	underlie	efficient	causation,	but	also	through	principles	which	imply	
that	 things	happen	because	they	are	on	a	path	that	 lead	toward	certain	
outcomes	–	notably,	 the	existence	of	 living,	 and	ultimately	of	 conscious	
organisms58	.»	[Nagel,	2012,	p.	67]	
	
To	this	point	panpsychism	has	not	taken	this	extra	step;	from	Nagel’s	perspective,	
the	panpsychist	is	being	unduly	conservative	about	the	kinds	of	laws	that	there	
are.	 If	 they	 can	 appeal	 only	 in	 their	 reductive,	 historicist,	 explanation	 of	 the	
emergence	 of	 conscious	 life	 to	 orthodox	 causal	 law	 their	 account	 will	 be	
unconvincing.	It	is	forced	to	take	the	form	of	a	“mentalistic	reductionism”	that	sees	
mentality	as	a	propensity	built	 into	the	nature	of	matter.	Nagel	 is	sceptical	that	
this	general	form	an	explanation	does	confer	any	intelligibility:	
«	The	 protopsychic	 properties	 of	 all	 matter	 …	 are	 postulated	 solely	
because	 they	are	needed	 to	explain	 the	appearance	of	 consciousness	at	
high	levels	of	organic	complexity.	Apart	from	that	nothing	is	known	about	
them:	 they	 are	 completely	 indescribable	 and	 have	 no	 predictable	 local	
effects59	.»	[Nagel,	2012,	pp.	61-62]	
	
So	as	an	answer	to	Nagel’s	two	questions,	then,	he	seems	to	have	come	to	believe	
that	 panpsychism	 can	 really	 only	 answer	 his	 constitutive	 question	 about	
conscious	 mentality.	 Explanations	 of	 its	 historical	 emergence	 or	 parallel	
explanations	 of	 cognition	 or	 value	 are	 going	 to	 need	 to	 appeal	 to	 his	 novel	
postulation	 of	 basic,	 teleological	 laws	 in	 the	 life	 sciences.	 As	 always,	 this	 need	
arises	because	Nagel	can	see	no	other	way	of	doing	justice	to	that	which	needs	to	
be	explained.	
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	Is	this	a	Vindication	of	Theism?	
In	 the	development	of	his	project,	Nagel	unfolds	a	dialectical	 contrast	between	
theism	 and	 materialism;	 predictably	 enough,	 both	 postulate	 «	explanation	
stoppers	»	 that	 fail	 to	 meet	 the	 requirement	 posed	 by	 Nagel’s	 «	form	 of	 the	
principle	 of	 sufficient	 reason 60 	».	 	 Theism	 ends	 the	 regress	 of	 justification	 in	
mentality,	admittedly	the	mentality	of	an	agent	of	an	unusual	kind	(as	it	also	has	
the	feature	of	existing	necessarily):	
	
«	Theism	offers	a	vicarious	understanding,	by	assigning	it	to	a	transcendent	mind	
whose	purposes	and	understanding	of	the	world	we	cannot	ourselves	fully	share,	
but	which	makes	it	possible	to	believe	that	the	world	is	intelligible,	even	if	not	to	
us61	.»		
		
As	a	counter-reaction	to	reductionist	naturalism,	the	view	is	well-motivated.	But,	
for	 Nagel,	 theism	 is	 finally	 unacceptable	 because	 it	 «	pushes	 the	 quest	 for	
intelligibility	outside	the	world62	».			
Materialism	is	fundamentally	grounded	on	a	compact	set	of	physical	laws	
that	are,	conceivably,	a	selection	from	alternative	possible	sets.	The	explanations	
it	 offers	 of	 our	 human	 capacities	 is	 insufficiently	 reassuring:	 «	evolutionary	
naturalism	provides	an	account	of	our	capacities	that	undermines	their	reliability,	
and	in	doing	so	undermines	itself63	.	»	
	Neither	 theism	 nor	 reductive	 naturalism	 (materialism)	 can,	 then,	 be	
anything	 other	 than	 a	 temporary	 stopping	 point	 for	 Nagel’s	 kind	 of	 objective	
idealist.	 The	 key	 elements	 Nagel	 isolates	 in	 both	 views	 is	 that	 they	 seek	
comprehensiveness,	 and	 must	 therefore	 include	 their	 own	 generation	 and	
acceptance.	They	must	be	«	reflexive	»	by	which	I	mean	that	both	views	have	to	
give	 an	 account	 of	 the	 social	 practices,	 norms	 and	 values	 in	 which	 the	 very	
enterprise	of	finding	out	the	fundamental	truth	about	reality	that	each	project	is	
embedded.	 Each	places	 a	 constraint	 on	 the	 vocabulary	we	 can	use	 to	 give	 this	
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account:	the	austere	resources	of	reductionist	naturalism	seems	unable	to	explain	
the	very	idea	of	a	reason	for	belief.	The	limited	resources	of	theism	postulate	an	
agent	 in	 some	 ways	 like	 us,	 but	 in	 a	 fundamental	 way	 not	 –	 an	 agent	 whose	
motivations	 must	 be	 opaque	 to	 us.	 Nagel’s	 aspiration	 is	 for	 something	 less	
ambitious:	a	reflective	«	placing	»	of	our	human	point	of	view	that	is	a	«	plausible	
picture	of	how	we	fit	into	the	world64.		»		
Rather	than	allowing	evolutionary	naturalism	to	undermine	our	most	basic	
capacities	of	knowledge	–	given	that	such	an	ambitiou	would	be	internally	self-
undermining	–	Nagel	 claims	 that	 the	argument	ought	 to	be	 reversed:	our	most	
«	basic	 forms	 of	 thought	»	 are	 not	 candidates	 for	 being	 undermined	 by	
evolutionary	understanding:	
	
«	[I]t	 seems	 reasonable	 to	 run	 the	 test	 equally	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction:	
namely,	to	evaluate	hypotheses	about	the	universe	and	how	we	have	come	
into	existence	by	reference	 to	ordinary	 judgements	 in	which	we	have	very	
high	confidence65	.»		
	
Again,	consistently	with	Nagel’s	previous	expressions	of	his	philosophical	outlook,	
we	 should	 not	 resile	 to	 quietism	 where	 that	 would	 mean	 delineating	 our	
conceptual	 scheme	 «	from	 within	»	 and	 noting	 differences	 between	 different	
forms	 of	 representation	without	 investigating	 issues	 of	 explanatory	 priority66 .	
Because	 reality	 is	 unitary,	 all	 our	 representations	 –	 of	 different	 degrees	 of	
«	perspectivalness	»	–	have	to	be	mutually	adjusted	and	reconciled	to	be	placed	in	
some	 intelligible	 relation	 to	 it:	 quietism	does	 not	 face	 up	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 «	the	
question	is	there,	whether	we	answer	it	or	not	67.		»		
	 The	failure	of	theism	and	reductive	naturalism,	then,	leaves	that	which	is	
to	be	explained	intact:	the	exercise	of	basic	capacities	of	knowledge.	
	
«	The	existence	of	conscious	minds	and	their	access	to	the	evident	truths	of	
ethics	and	mathematics	are	among	the	data	that	a	theory	of	the	world	and	our	
place	in	it	has	yet	to	explain.	They	are	clearly	part	of	what	is	the	case,	just	as	
much	as	the	data	about	the	physical	world	provided	by	perception	and	the	
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conclusions	of	scientific	reasoning	about	what	would	best	explain	that	data.	
We	cannot	just	assume	that	the	latter	category	of	thought	has	priority	over	
the	others,	so	that	what	it	cannot	explain	is	not	real68	.»		
	
These	 facts	 are	 as	 they	 are;	 Nagel	 is	 convinced	 that	 neither	 reductionist	
materialism,	nor	theism,	offer	any	credible	explanation	for	them.	Like	Ryle,	in	his	
rejection	of	 the	 ghost	 in	 the	machine,	Nagel	 is	 aware	of	 how	 these	 two	 flawed	
conceptions	–	one	of	mentality	and	the	other	of	matter	–	work	in	tandem	to	make	
both	 equally	 unacceptable.69	The	 picture	 of	 a	mechanised	 nature	 into	which	 a	
divine	agent	intrudes	is	a	macro-level	equivalent	of	the	micro-level	account	of	the	
mental-physical	relation	to	which	Ryle	and	Nagel	are	equally	opposed.		
	
How	Plausible	are	these	Arguments?	
I	turn	now	from	exposition	to	criticism.	Nagel’s	book	has	met	with	a	great	deal	of	
criticism,	much	of	it	severe,	but	not	always	charitable.	I	will	begin	with	the	simpler	
cases	where	exegetical	charity	might	have	led	to	a	more	reasonable	understanding	
of	Nagel’s	position	that	might	have	forestalled	some	of	this	criticism	(or	at	least	
muted	its	tone).	
	 First,	 Nagel’s	 defense	 of	 «	common	 sense	».	 Peter	 Godfrey-Smith’s	
response,	in	a	fair-minded	review,	is	the	most	forthright:	«	this	is	one	area	in	which	
intuitions	are	worth	nothing70	».	 I	 think	that	 is	correct:	 it	would	be	unfortunate	
indeed	if	a	developed	scientific	theory	were	being	rejected	on	the	basis	of	common	
sense.	However,	that	would	be	a	very	uncharitable	reading	of	Nagel’s	argument.	
By	vindicating	«	common	sense	»	Nagel	is	not	setting	the	truth	of	any	specific	claim	
of	 common	 sense	 against	 the	 truth	 of	 a	 theory;	 he	 is,	 rather,	 vindicating	 the	
underlying	 capacities	 for	 knowledge	 manifested	 in	 such	 claims.	 The	 only	
exception	to	this	claim	are	the	truths	of	reason	that	Nagel	claims	are	self-evident,	
but	if	he	is	right,	then	the	interest	here	is	in	the	claim	of	self-evidence	and	not	in	
the	observation	that	such	truths	form	part	of	common	sense	(if	they	do).	If	there	
are	a	priori	truths	–	and	plausibly	there	are	–	every	view	needs	an	explanation	of	
their	special	epistemic	status.	
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Nagel	 is	 avowedly	 a	 rationalist	 and	 has	 been	 since	 The	 Possibility	 of	
Altruism:	we	have	a	 capacity	 for	 reason	 that	 is	 expressed	by	our	 capacities	 for	
knowing	specific	truths	of	mathematics	and	ethics	(to	take	two	of	Nagel’s	favourite	
examples)71.	When	that	capacity	seeks	to	find	a	home	for	itself	in	the	world,	and	
does	not	find	a	convincing	explanation	of	this	in	the	world-view	of	the	reductionist	
naturalist,	Nagel	asks	whether	another	view	is	possible.		
	 A	second	objection	runs	as	follows:	ought	the	philosopher	be	lecturing	to	
the	 scientist?	 Again,	 that	 is	 not	 Nagel’s	 view:	 reductionist	 naturalism	 is	
extrapolated	 from	the	actual	 results	of	 the	sciences	and	 is	not	 itself	a	scientific	
view.	 Conversely,	 the	 philosophical	 question	 of	 whether	 there	 are	 irreducibly	
teleological	 forms	 of	 causation	 has	 not	 been	 answered	 solely	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 a	
mechanistic	 world-picture	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century	 as	 John	 Hawthorne	 and	
Daniel	Nolan	point	out	in	a	paper	to	which	Nagel	refers	approvingly72.	
If	the	question	had	been	settled	in	this	way,	then	at	least	we	are	owed	an	
account	of	 the	empirical	content	of	 the	theory	and	the	process	by	which	 it	was	
refuted.	Yet,	Hawthorne	and	Nolan	note	that	«	the	relation	of	 the	hypothesis	of	
final	 causation	 to	 evidence	 is	 much	 more	 of	 a	 philosophical	 puzzle	 »	 than	
workaday	cases	of	explaining,	say,	how	phlogiston	theory	was	overturned	by	the	
evidence.	In	their	paper,	Hawthorne	and	Nolan	construct	a	model	teleological	law,	
where	law-likeness	is	explained	in	David	Lewis’s	way	as	combining	simplicity	and	
informativeness.	They	then	ask,	rhetorically,	why	there	could	not	be	laws	of	this	
kind?	(They	strengthen	their	argument	by	noting	that	teleological	laws	might	be	
found	 in	 the	 special	 sciences	 and	 thereby	 restricted	 to	 particular	 domains.)	 If	
Hawthorne	and	Nolan	have	presented,	as	it	were,	a	«	proof	of	concept	»	then	we	
can	conclude,	at	least,	that	Nagel’s	proposed	natural	teleology	is	not	a	priori	false	
nor	internally	inconsistent.		If	he	can	make	a	prima	facie	case	that	teleology	of	this	
kind	is	necessary	to	explain	the	sciences	of	life,	then	there	is,	as	it	were,	a	case	to	
answer	–	even	if	the	final	determination	is	handed	over	to	the	empirical	sciences	
and	not	left	to	philosophers.	
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	 A	third	objection	could	be	viewed	as	meta-philosophical:	Nagel	is	bundling	
together	non-reductionist	solutions	to	the	explanation	of	how	we	have	knowledge	
across	several	domains	such	as	the	moral,	the	mathematical,	and	a	priori	truths	
about	 the	 structure	 of	 reason	 itself.	 Neutral	 monism	 is	 an	 overarching	
metaphysical	theory	that	explains	the	fundamental	nature	of	the	reality	that	can	
accommodate	such	truths	and	the	capacities	of	reason	that	underlie	them:	so	we	
need	an	account	of	the	sciences	of	life	consistent	–	strictly,	more	consistent	–	with	
the	 truth	 of	 neutral	monism	or	 panpsychism.	 (We	have	 seen	Nagel	 canvas	 the	
advantages	or	disadvantages	of	both	views.)	
If	this	his	how	we	are	best	to	understand	Nagel’s	project,	then	it	looks	like	
a	particular	ambitious	version	of	an	inference	to	the	best	explanation.	Mind	and	
Cosmos	is	the	search	for	an	overall	package	of	commitments	that	is	strengthened	
by	 its	 comprehensiveness.	 The	 critic	may	 urge	 that	we	 ought,	 case	 by	 case,	 to	
explain	 specific	 problems	 in	 specific	 ways	 and	 that	 inferences	 to	 the	 best	
explanation	are	not	meta-philosophically	defensible.	But	if	he	is	mistaken	on	this	
point,	then	Nagel	is	at	least	in	good	company:	for	example,	David	Lewis’s	On	the	
Plurality	of	Worlds	defends	modal	realism	precisely	by	such	an	inference	to	the	
best	explanation	that	spans	solutions	to	several	distinct	philosophical	problems73.	
Lewis	 seems	 also	 to	 believe	 that	 his	 overall	 view	 –	 whatever	 its	 intrinsic	
plausibility	 –	 gains	 credibility	 from	 its	 comprehensive	 coverage	 of	 disparate	
problems.	
Most	charitably,	Nagel	is	not	telling	the	scientist	in	the	life	sciences	what	to	
do	 in	 the	 practice	 of	 her	 discipline,	 simply	 freeing	 up	 that	 practice	 from	 false	
assumptions	imposed	by	other	philosophers	–	not	scientists:	
«	Philosophy	cannot	generate	such	explanations;	it	can	only	point	out	the	
gaping	 lack	 of	 them,	 and	 the	 obstacles	 to	 constructing	 them	 out	 of	
presently	available	materials74.	»		
	
Reductionist	materialism	is	the	premature	closing	down	of	options	that	need	to	
be	 kept	 open.	 This	 is	 a	 claim	 at	 a	 high	 level	 of	 generality;	 I	 have	 heard	 the	
distinguished	 philosopher	 of	 science	Hilary	 Putnam	 remark	 that	Karl	 Popper’s	
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criterion	of	falsifiability	could	not	be	a	mark	of	a	genuine	theory	because	many	
theories	are	so	crazy	that	there	is	no	point	testing	them	in	the	first	place.	But	Nagel	
is	not	adding	another	crazy	theory	to	this	list;	simply	issuing	a	reminder	that	the	
case	against	basic	teleological	laws	in	the	life	sciences	has	not	conclusively	been	
made	–	a	claim	at	a	high	level	of	generality.	So	there	is	at	least	a	prima	facie	case	
for	 considering	 whether	 teleological	 laws	 are	 admissible	 candidates	 for	 a	
renovation	of	the	life	sciences.	The	task	of	producing	such	theories	is	not	Nagel’s;	
but	that	task	can	be	pursued	freed	from	a	false	philosophical	preconception	that	
laws	of	a	certain	character	are	not	even	candidates	for	reasonable	consideration.	
	 A	fifth	objection	seem	to	me	to	carry	more	weight:	it	is	raised	by	John	Dupré	
in	 his	 insightful	 review	 of	 the	 book.	 Nagel	 postulates	 irreducibly	 teleological	
developmental	laws	to	explain	why	conscious	mentality	(and	rationality,	and	an	
inner	nisus	towards	value)	historically	developed	in	a	way	that	makes	them	more	
probable	 than	 they	 would	 be	 on	 a	 purely	 mechanistic	 understanding	 of	 their	
development.	As	Dupré	notes,	 it	may	certainly	be	desirable	that	an	explanation	
make	an	event	very	probable	relative	to	the	set	up	in	which	it	develops.	However,	
he	also	notes	not	all	explanations	work	like	this:	
«	Nagel	constantly	asserts	that	to	explain	the	existence	of	consciousness,	etc.,	
evolution	must	not	 just	show	that	 they	are	possible,	but	also	 that	 they	are	
likely,	or	to	be	expected	…	[this]	seems	to	me	poorly	motivated.	At	the	time	of	
my	birth	it	was	very	unlikely	that	I	would	several	decades	later	be	reviewing	
a	book	by	a	famous	philosopher;	but	it	is	not	mysterious	that	this	eventually	
came	 about.	 The	 improbability	 has	 been	 declining	 rapidly	 for	 the	 last	 few	
decades.	 Just	 so	with	 evolution.	The	 evolution	of	 reason	may	well	 be	 very	
unlikely	indeed	on	a	young,	hot	planet.	It's	a	great	deal	more	likely	by	the	time	
there	are	highly	social,	if	not	yet	rational,	multicellular	organisms	with	very	
complex	nervous	systems75.	»	
	
Perhaps	 we	 should	 view	 the	 developmental	 process	 as	 involving	 a	 series	 of	
discontinuous	 breaks	 that,	 in	 each	 case,	 fundamentally	 re-set	 the	 baseline	
probabilities	relative	to	each	new	set	up.	
That	may	invite	a	response	from	Nagel	that	we	would	like	to	do	better:	his	
rationalist,	teleologically	grounded	explanation	of	the	emergence	of	conscious	and	
rational	 subjects	 is	more	 intellectually	 satisfying	 than	 its	materialist	 rival.	 (We	
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have	seen	that	his	critique	of	emergentism	involves	denying	Dupré’s	last	quoted	
point:	for	Nagel,	no	amount	of	biological	complexity	can	explain	the	emergence	of	
conscious	mentality.)	But	the	point	is	that	there	is	a	gap	between	the	claim	that	
one	style	of	explanation	can	do	better	than	another	when	it	comes	to	making	the	
development	of	an	event	more	probable,	and	the	claim	that	does	better	in	making	
the	occurrence	of	the	event	more	«	intelligible	».		
I	take	Dupré’s	deeper	point	to	be	that	intelligibility	is,	in	that	sense,	quite	a	
weak	constraint	and	both	kinds	of	laws	–	causal–mechanical	and	teleological	–	can	
meet	it.	It	may	be	less	intellectually	satisfying	to	postulate	a	low-probability	event	
that	then	makes	subsequent	events	more	probable	relative	to	the	new	set	up	that	
it	 establishes;	 but	 it	meets	 Nagel’s	 constraint	 of	 being	 intelligible.	 Perhaps	we	
simply	cannot	do	any	better	in	this	case.		
	 The	sixth,	and	final,	objection	is	that	Nagel	is	too	loose	in	his	definitions	and	
attacks	a	straw	man	–	or	a	succession	of	them.	An	example	that	a	critic	might	cite	
is	Daniel	Stoljar’s	paper	in	which	he	argues	that	neutral	monism	is	actually	a	form	
of	physicalism	and	not	an	alternative	to	it.76	I	think	the	best	response	here	is	to	
say	that	of	course	a	book	like	Mind	and	Cosmos	is	an	invitation	to	further	work	and	
to	 further	 arguments	 –	 such	 as	 formulations	 of	 non-standard	 versions	 of	
physicalism	 of	 the	 kind	 Stoljar	 develops.	 If	 no	 one	 remains	 committed	 to	 the	
epistemological	 project	 of	 unity	 represented	 by	 the	 Encyclopedia	 of	 Unified	
Science,	or	 to	psycho-physical	 reductionism,	 then	 from	Nagel’s	perspective	 that	
can	only	be	good	news.	In	fact,	 it	seems	to	me	that	he	is	right	to	identify	«	bald	
naturalism	 »	 as	 a	 strong	 undercurrent	 in	 recent	 philosophy	 in	 the	 analytic	
tradition.	
	
Conclusion	
I	 think	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 describe	 the	 critical	 reception	 of	 Nagel’s	 book	 as	
unfortunate.	 It	 should	 be	 clear	 from	 all	 of	 the	 foregoing	 that	 Nagel	 is	 simply	
working	through	the	implications	of	philosophical	commitments	that	he	has	held	
for	decades.	«	The	Psychophysical	Nexus	»	is	only	a	comparatively	recent	paper;	
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his	commitment	to	panpsychism	pre-dates	it	by	decades.	The	central	part	of	the	
argument	of	Mind	and	Cosmos	is	driven	by	Nagel’s	attempt	to	specify	the	impact	of	
absorbing	 the	 claims	 of	 the	 later	 paper	 into	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 earlier	 and	
envisioning	the	consequences	for	the	sciences	of	life77.	That	we	ought	not	simply	
to	assume	that	the	idea	of	a	teleological	law	is	an	obsolete	relic	is	an	option	worth	
pursuing,	particularly	given	Hawthorne	and	Nolan’s	clear	explanation	of	how	a	
law	could	take	this	 form.	They	explain	how	such	 laws	are	possible;	Nagel	gives	
grounds	 for	 taking	some	of	 these	 laws	to	be	actual.	 It	 is	not	his	 job	to	discover	
them,	but	to	enrich	the	intellectual	possibilities	of	those	working	in	the	sciences	
of	 life	 given	 that	 we	 can	 all	 agree	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 explaining	 mentality,	
rationality	and	value	are	hard	problems.	
On	specific	issues,	Nagel	is	not	alone	in	holding	the	views	he	does:	he	shares	
his	conception	of	the	problem	of	consciousness	with	David	Chalmers;	he	shares	
his	«	reasons	realism	»	with	Charles	Larmore	and	Thomas	Scanlon;	he	shares	his	
panpsychism	with	Galen	Strawson78.	Neutral	monism,	 in	 its	Russellian	guise,	 is	
currently	 undergoing	 a	 resurgence79 .	 Nagel’s	 sin,	 it	 seems,	 was	 to	 attempt	 to	
weave	 these	 views	 together	 in	 a	 single	 synthesis	 and	 then	 derive	 implications	
from	them	for	the	life	sciences	that	led	to	his	critique	of	the	theory	of	evolution.	It	
is	the	latter	that	has	earned	him	the	hostility	of	several	of	his	reviewers.	
	 Nagel	 explicitly	 states	 that	 he	 has	 been	 influenced	 by	 the	 critique	 of	
evolutionary	theory	developed	by	proponents	of	the	intelligent	design	hypothesis,	
but	he	is	equally	explicit	that	he	rejects	both	that	hypothesis	of	intelligent	design	
and	the	theism	that	grounds	it.	It	seems	odd,	then,	for	his	critics	to	accuse	him	of	
supernaturalism	 when	 Nagel	 explicitly	 states	 that	 specific	 explanations	 in	 the	
natural	sciences	cannot	be	grounded	on	facts	about	divine	agency	–	the	conception	
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of	God	as	some	kind	of	party	magician.80	The	general	charge	seems	to	be	that	Nagel	
is	 keeping	 bad	 company. 81 	But	 it	 can	 hardly	 be	 a	 constraint	 on	 a	 work	 of	
speculative	metaphysics	 that	 it	ought	not	 to	be	published	because	some	 things	
ought	not	to	be	said,	as	it	were,	«	in	front	of	the	children	».	Nagel’s	sympathies	are	
with	intelligent	design’s	critique	of	reductionist	naturalism	–	not	with	intelligent	
design	itself,	that	he	makes	clear	is	an	explanatory	non-starter.	
	 More	generally,	there	are	complaints	that	Nagel	begs	the	question	when	it	
comes	to	assuming	the	truth	of	moral	or	mathematical	realism,	or	to	there	being	
truths	of	reason,	or	to	there	being	a	hard	problem	of	consciousness.82	These	really	
are	instances	where	one	philosopher	announces	assumptions	and	draws	a	certain	
conclusion	only	for	critics	to	respond	that,	given	the	conclusion,	the	assumptions	
are	unacceptable	–	it	is	not	as	if	Nagel	has	not	already	discharged	his	intellectual	
responsibilities	in	making	arguments	for	each	of	these	claims	in	what	is	now	an	
extensive	body	of	work.	Each	is,	undoubtedly,	a	disputable	claim;	but	there	are	not	
many	indisputable	claims	in	philosophy.	If	Nagel’s	inventory	of	his	own	candidates	
for	indisputable	truths	is	faring	as	poorly	as	everyone	else’s	similar	list	then	so	be	
it.	However,	given	that	Nagel	has	made	the	case	for	these	theses	elsewhere	is	he	
not	 entitled	 to	 draw	 out	 what	 would	 be,	 for	 him,	 the	 inference	 to	 the	 best	
explanation	that	makes	them	both	probable	and	credible?	
	 Perhaps	we	should	conclude	that	philosophers	do	stand	to	learn	at	 least	
this	much	from	the	sciences:	Helen	Longino	has	convincingly	made	the	case	for	
what	she	calls	theoretical	or	explanatory	pluralism.83	We	need	to	keep	as	many	
theoretical	options	open	in	the	sciences	as	possible,	because	that	which	we	seek	
to	explain	is	very	complex.	She	concludes	that	we	may	need	many	intellectual	tools	
in	our	toolkit.	Hasok	Chang	has	added	the	claim	that	we	need	a	lot	of	theoretical	
options	in	the	sciences	even	to	explain	very	simple	things,	for	which	we	do	know	
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that	we	need	a	lot	of	intellectual	tools	in	our	toolkit.84	For	a	subject	on	a	less	secure	
epistemic	 basis	 than	 the	 sciences,	 namely	 philosophy,	 this	 would	 seem	 to	 be	
methodologically	 sound	 advice	 pertinent	 to	 the	 present	 case.	 Speculative	
rationalism	 is	not	well	 represented	 in	 the	 toolkit	of	 recent	philosophers,	but	 it	
would	be	unfortunate	if	philosophy	decided	it	could	dispense	with	it	altogether.		
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